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ABSTRACT:  Although electricity losses constitute an important, but inevitable, amount of 
wasted resources (and a share that has to be funded), they remain one of the lesser known parts 
of an electricity system, and this despite the fact that the decisions of generators, transmission 
and distribution system operators and consumers all impact on them. In this paper we analyse 
the effects of such losses from two perspectives: from that of consumption or outflows and 
from that of generation or inflows. Given that end-user consumption varies across the day, 
consumption has direct implications for electricity losses. Indeed, demand-side management 
policies seek to encourage consumers to use less energy during peak hours and to reduce 
network congestion. At the same time, from the perspective of generation, the recent growth in 
distributed generation has modified the traditional, unidirectional, downward flows in 
electricity systems. This affects losses as energy is produced in the lower voltage network, 
which is closer to points of consumption. In this paper we evaluate the impact of consumption 
patterns and different generation technologies on energy losses. To do so, we draw on data 
from a real electricity system with a high level of renewable penetration, namely, that of Spain 
between 2011 and 2013. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyse the real 
impact of consumption and the effect of each generation technology on energy losses, offering 
an opportunity to evaluate the potential benefits of demand-side management policies and 
distributed generation. Based on our results, we make a number of regulatory recommendations 
aimed at exploiting to the full these potential benefits. Our results should serve as a baseline for 
countries that are in the early stages of implementing these policies.   
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1 Introduction
An electricity system serves to transport energy to consumption points, given that genera-
tion plants are not always sited close to homes and industries. To guarantee the success of
the system, four essential activities have to be successfully managed: generation, transmis-
sion, distribution and retailing. Traditionally, electricity is generated in large-scale plants
located near raw materials, or reservoirs in the case of hydropower. Economies of scale are
critical in the generation stage before the energy can be sent to points of consumption via
a transmission network comprising high-voltage lines. In recent years, a number of new,
small generation plants have been connected to the distribution grid, which are known as
distributed generation (DG) (Ackermann et al., 2001). To distribute the electricity among
consumers, low-voltage (LV) distribution lines are used to transport power to meters. Fi-
nally, retailing is responsible for billing.
Owing to certain physical phenomena, electricity systems always yield less than 100%, with
some energy being lost as it flows through the system’s components: lines, electric trans-
formers, etc. This means that when a consumer i wants to consume qi units of energy (UoE)
as recorded by their meter, (qi + δi) UoE have to be produced by a generation plant, given
that δi UoE are lost in the grids. In the aggregate, Q represents total meter consumption
(Eq. 1) and QL is the meter consumption with the losses incurred (Eq. 2):
Q =
∑
i
qi (1)
QL =
∑
i
(qi + δi) =
∑
i
qil (2)
Cross country comparisons of electricity losses are far from straightforward, because, among
other reasons, regulatory definitions vary; consumption from the meter (or fraud) may or
may not be considered as an energy loss; and heterogeneous levels of voltages are operated
by the transmission system operators (TSOs) and the distribution system operators (DSOs)
(ERGEG, 2008). In Spain, losses in 2012 represented 8.90% of the energy injected in the
grid (generation and imports), resulting in an annual cost of 1,160 M1 for the Spanish elec-
tricity system, which has to be borne by the final electricity consumers. To put this figure in
context, total loss levels published in the World Bank Database2 for other countries in the
same year were 7.92% in the United Kingdom, 3.94% in Germany, 6.74% in France, 5.40%
in Austria, 6.29% in the United States of America and 5.06% in Australia.
The mechanism via which energy losses affect the retail price is illustrated in Figure 1.
First, based on the characteristics of the formation of the electricity wholesale price (WP),
losses exert an upward pressure on total demand, so that the D curve is displaced upwards to
DL. Second, real hourly demand might differ from that estimated on the day-ahead whole-
sale market, which means additional adjustment costs are incurred. Third, when losses are
(totally or partially) borne by the end-users, three possible mechanisms can be applied: the
regular network tariff (as in France, Sweden, Norway, etc.), a special tariff (as in Austria,
Poland, etc.) or other specific mechanisms (Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom and Spain)
(ERGEG, 2008). In the end, regardless of the mechanism, when the losses are borne by
the end-users, the amount they pay (qil · pil) and the consumer surplus are both affected
(ENTSO-E, 2014). In the period 2011-2013, losses in Spain represented between 1.47 and
1Annual cost of losses is calculated by multiplying hourly losses of energy by the MWh hourly price.
Costs of CO2 emissions and energy savings targets are not included. This is the same methodology adopted
herein to calculate loss costs.
2Source: World Bank Database - Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output).
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS (last consulted on 15 September, 2015).
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5.19% of the retail price of electricity3.
Figure 1: General loss impacts on the retail market price.
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Note: D is the aggregate demand curve of consumers at the meter (without losses); DL is the same curve
taking losses into consideration; S is the aggregate supply curve of generation; d and s are the demand and
supply curve for a consumer i; qi is the individual consumption at the meter (without losses); qil is the
individual meter consumption with losses; pil is the price associated with qil; Q is the aggregation of qi;
QL is the aggregation of qil; P is the wholesale price associated with Q; PL is the wholesale price
associated with QL.
The implementation of policies that modify electricity flows, on the demand and supply side,
could have an impact on losses. In Spain, as in other European countries, they include, for
example, the massive introduction of intelligent meter systems (or smart meters) to promote
the active participation of consumers in the electricity supply market via the use of inno-
vative pricing formulas, and the promotion of electricity generation from renewable energy
sources (RES-E), which in most cases has been implemented in conjunction with a priority
dispatch for generation from promoted technologies (European Directive 2009/72/EC).
On the demand side (energy outflows), the impact of consumers on losses is unequal, de-
pending on the voltage of the network where consumers are connected and how peaked their
demand profile is (Shaw et al., 2009). The role of the DSO regarding consumers is passive
since the unbundling of activities (European Directive 1996/92/EC), while the possibilities
of modifying peak demand profiles are restricted to specific technological solutions, such as
smart meters, which can provide consumers with clearer price signals that might in turn
modify their behaviour. In this line, European Directive 2012/27/EC, requires network tar-
iffs and regulation improvements to support dynamic pricing for demand response by final
consumers, such as time-of-use tariffs, critical peak-pricing, real time pricing and peak time
rebates.
On the supply side (energy inflows) and in response to the 2020 European Strategy, the
3These are average costs and vary with the level of voltage where consumers are connected and the
tariff scheme being implemented. In general, the lowest costs are associated with the heaviest consumers
connected to the highest voltage grids.
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share of energy produced by RES-E in Europe (EU28) has increased from 14.32% in 2004 to
25.37% in 2013. This change has been accompanied by the installation of new small RES-E
plants connected directly to DSO networks (DG) and located close to the points of consump-
tion. This had had a significant impact on most electricity systems. For instance, in Spain,
a quarter of the country’s total generation between 2011 and 2013 was produced directly by
plants connected to this network. These changes have modified traditional unidirectional
flows from transmission to distribution, and a series of technical and operational problems
have arisen in relation to their geographical dispersion, predictability, the flexibility of the
remaining generation, the correlation between production and consumption profiles, and the
extent to which the network can absorb the imbalances between them.
Although intuition tells us that a higher share of generation in close proximity to con-
sumers would reduce energy losses and grid congestion, as the energy would have to travel
over shorter distances, DG plants are not always properly sited close to the main points
of consumption, their production is not always dispatchable4 and the smaller plants are
often operated and fully controlled by their owners (Eurelectric, 2013a). As a result, DG
production might not coincide with demand requirements. A number of authors, including
Quezada et al. (2006) and Marinopoulos et al. (2011), report losses follow a U-shape trajec-
tory as function of the DG penetration in the networks5, which means they tend to fall at
low levels of DG capacity, but increase after a given level is reached. The Spanish regulatory
framework6 provides for the free location of electricity generation, which has resulted in the
heterogeneous establishment of DG capacity throughout the country’s grid.
The potential consequences, problems and benefits to be derived from the active partici-
pation of consumers (smart meters) and the widespread penetration of DG have called the
current DSO regulatory framework into question. In this regard, CEER (2015) proposes
various ideas that need to be considered in the future. For example, in the case of con-
sumption and smart meters, future tariffs should aim at encouraging consumers to reduce
peak demand as a lever for increasing the efficiency of electricity systems. Moreover, tariffs
should give clear economic signals, enable DSOs to recover their costs and be compatible
with retail competition. In the case of generation, DG has increased the complexity of flows
in the distribution grids and with them the challenges for their efficient management. Hence,
it has been proposed that the relationship between the TSO and the DSO needs to evolve by
adopting a number of principles: a whole system approach, greater coordination, a greater
exchange of data, greater flexibility and a fairer cost sharing strategy. Moreover, as the
interaction between, and communication with, consumers and producers increases, the DSO
should take on arrange of new activities and responsibilities. Here, smart grid investments
seem to represent a key facilitator (Farhangi, 2010).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have empirically assessed (ex-post) the
determinants of losses on transmission and distribution from the demand and supply side
in a whole real electricity system. We have selected Spain because, among the five biggest
economies of Europe, it had the highest share of RES-E7 in 2013: 36.39%. In this study we,
first, estimate the impact of consumption on losses, which allows us to quantify the poten-
4Dispatchable sources are technologies whose output can be adjusted or turned on/off on request. This
is not the case of photovoltaic systems, where for a third of the day they do not produce, or small wind
plants.
5Level of DG penetration in a network is the share of energy generated by DG in an area with respect
to total consumption.
6Royal Decree 54/1997.
7From 2004 to 2013, the five biggest economies in Europe increased their RES-E share of energy produc-
tion from 9.40 to 25.59% in Germany, 3.54 to 13.85% in the UK, 13.79 to 16.87% in France, 16.09 to 31.30%
in Italy, and 18.98 to 36.39% in Spain. Source: Eurostat Database - Short Assessment of Renewable Energy
Sources (% of electricity generation from all sources). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares
(last consulted on 24 September, 2015).
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tial loss reductions of policies devoted to smoothing the consumption demand profile due to
lower levels of grid congestion. Second, we estimate the costs and the short/long-run effects
on losses for each power generation technology. An interesting comparison is conducted
between DG technologies (wind, solar and CHP) installed during the last decade in Spain
and all other traditional base sources (nuclear, coal, combined cycle), in which we evaluate
their differences in terms of losses along with their economic costs and benefits. This allows
us to make a contribution to the scarce literature examining economy-wide aspects of DG
(Allan et al., 2015). Our results should be useful for regulators and policymakers in countries
with a low penetration of RES-E, or that are in an earlier stage in the implementation of
DG, in order that they might take better advantage of their potential. Indeed, today, the
distribution network is used for quite a different purpose to that for which it was employed
two decades ago.
In this paper, Section 2 provides an overview of the related academic literature. The Eu-
ropean regulatory framework of losses and the Spanish case are explained in Section 3,
including definitions and characteristics. The model and empirical strategy are described in
Section 4 and, in Section 5 the results of the estimations are presented from the perspective
of the outflow (consumption) and inflow (generation). Losses are quantified in terms of
flows and economic cost. Finally, Section 6 includes conclusions, policy implications and
regulatory recommendations.
2 Related Literature
The literature examining electricity losses can be classified according to the scope of the
policy on either the demand or supply sides. This review section is organised according to
this focus and on the impact of policies oriented at modifying either consumer or TSO/DSO
behaviour.
In the case of demand policies impacting consumer behaviour (energy outflows), demand
side management (DSM) is seen to play a key role. The main target of DSM is to shift
demand from peak to off-peak periods so as to obtain a better performance from the in-
frastructure, avoid the congestion problems affecting certain nodes8, adapt demand to the
capacity of generation at each moment in time and reduce losses. DSM calls on various
techniques: load limiters, load-interruptible programs, time-of-use pricing and smart meter-
ing (Strbac, 2008). Information and communication technology (ICT) is a major facilitator
of the implementation of DSM. The impact of DSM on losses has been estimated by Shaw
et al. (2009) and Cronenberg et al. (2012).
First, Shaw et al. (2009) simulate potential loss reductions by changing the shape of the
demand profile for Electricity Network West (ENW), one of the 14 distribution network op-
erators in Great Britain. The study focuses on domestic consumers that present a strongly
peaked demand profile, as they pay a single flat rate for each unit of consumption, irre-
spective of the time period. As the variable component of losses depends on the square of
current, this could be reduced if the peak load is delayed to off-peak periods. They use
a spreadsheet model that combines network power flow and loss data with consumption
profiles and report total loss reductions of up to 1.4%, depending on the peak reduction and
when this delay is allocated. Second, Cronenberg et al. (2012) simulate potential loss reduc-
tions from active demand (AD) programs aimed at reducing domestic peak loads in Spain,
Germany, Italy and Belgium projected to 2020. They consider a constant and linear rate
of losses and monetize the loss reductions from an aggregate perspective by multiplying the
simulated results by the average hourly price of electricity. In Spain, total loss reductions
8A node represents the physical location in a transmission or distribution network where energy is injected
by generators (inflows) or withdrawn by consumers (outflows).
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range between 1.2 and 4.81%, depending on the scenario considered, with the highest values
coinciding with the combination of two effects: a 35% reduction in peak load and a 20%
reduction in overall consumption.
Consumption out of the meter produces non-technical losses (NTLs), which have conse-
quences for total electricity demand, the quality of supply, the system’s total income, etc.
NTLs have traditionally been a problem in developing countries; however, in the context
of the present economic crisis they have become problematic in the developed world, too.
Depuru et al. (2011) describe how such factors as unemployment, the straitened finances
of consumers and rising electricity prices can increase NTLs. Among the policies proposed
to alleviate these losses and their economic consequences we find subsidies to low-income
consumers, thorough audits of electricity consumption at the distribution level, stricter law
enforcement and smart metering. In Spain, unemployment has reached record levels during
the crisis which strongly suggests that these losses should not be ignored. As Smith (2004)
has noted, while NTLs cannot be precisely computed, they can at least be estimated, though
this falls outside the scope of this paper.
In short, studies on the demand side report that demand policies have a significant and
positive effect on both losses in transmission and distribution. However, Shaw et al. (2009)
and Cronenberg et al. (2012) constitute simulations and ex-ante studies; moreover, they do
not analyse the impact of each generation source covering the peak demand profile.
In the case of supply policies affecting TSO and DSO behaviour (energy inflows), the pene-
tration of DG has given rise to an academic debate about its consequences for losses. Due to
the mathematical complexity of this area, two different approaches, providing similar out-
comes, are reviewed here. In the first, Quezada et al. (2006), Marinopoulos et al. (2011) and
Hung et al. (2013) estimate the impact of losses for a simple electricity feeder9. In the sec-
ond, Delfanti et al. (2013) use a probabilistic approach to consider a larger electricity system.
Taking the simple feeder approach, Quezada et al. (2006) compute annual energy loss vari-
ations with different levels of penetration and concentration of DG in a radial line. They
conclude that not all technologies have the same effect on losses. For instance, photovoltaic
(PV) energy presents a higher correlation with consumption and a lower impact on losses,
while wind power is more random, does not match as well with consumption and, conse-
quently, has a worse impact on losses. Marinopoulos et al. (2011) evaluate loss reductions
with a dispersed PV penetration using stochastic processes for load time-varying and PV
generation in a feeder located in a city in northern Greece. Their results are in line with
those of Quezada et al. (2006): losses follow a U-shape trajectory with the degree of PV
penetration. The best solution is a uniform distribution of plants across a feeder, although
this is extremely difficult to achieve in reality. Finally, Hung et al. (2013) identify the best
locations, optimal sizes and power factors of DG units at various locations in order to min-
imize power losses. Among their results, it is interesting to highlight that dispatchable DG
units perform better than non-dispatchable units in terms of loss impact and voltage profile
enhancement.
A different approach is adopted by Delfanti et al. (2013), in which they use a Monte Carlo
process to estimate loss evolution with DG penetration. They consider ten DG rated powers
from 0.5 to 10 MW and estimate the probability of loss variations for each case. They find
loss reductions are nearly always achieved for low levels of DG penetration. A higher DG
penetration level raises the likelihood of increasing and reducing losses, which mainly de-
pends on the specific characteristics of each case: the DG production profile, its correlation
9An electricity feeder is a medium-voltage (MV) power line extending from a distribution substation to
the transformers used for reducing the supply to LV, i.e., the voltage used by domestic consumers.
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with the demand profile, the presence of reverse flows, load locations, etc. An additional
solution for potentially reducing losses for high DG penetration levels is network reconfig-
uration, which involves opening and closing switches in the distribution grid in response to
flow changes (Lueken et al., 2012).
Strbac et al. (2007) point to the importance of well-located DG plants coinciding with
peak-demand consumption to improve losses, which depends on technology, size, network
topology, etc. The same generation technology in different locations might have the opposite
impact on losses. For instance, micro CHP production in the UK is better correlated with
the winter peak load (5:30 pm) than is PV.
In the case of regulatory strategies, many regulators around the world have implemented
incentive-based schemes to promote efficiency improvements in natural monopoly activi-
ties (TSO/DSO) since 1990s. In addition to quality service improvements, loss reductions
have been another performance target. In traditional electricity systems, DSOs can decide
whether to apply specific strategies to reduce losses in their infrastructure, such as strength-
ening or reconfiguring networks to reduce congestion, installing low-loss level transformers,
etc. Moreover, within a single country, each DSO has its own specific characteristics, so
that incentive-based regulation is a general solution for all. In the UK, as in Spain, the
quality of service and network energy losses are individually considered, separately incen-
tivized and affects revenues of each DSO (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). Jamasb et al. (2012)
estimated the marginal cost of improving quality in the UK DSO companies between 1995
and 2003. With respect to losses, the estimated average marginal cost was 2.4 pence per
KWh, while the regulator’s incentive or reward was 4.8 pence. However, this improvement
was not equal across all companies because some were insufficiently incentivized and not
all of them adopted the same strategies to reduce losses. Hence, incentives need to be well
designed to make significant reductions in losses.
The significant increase in DG penetration in recent years has modified the traditional
top-down approach to energy. Flows are becoming increasingly unpredictable and this is
having consequences for local congestion, voltage and system security. In general, DG cur-
tailment and feed-in management rules are not in the hands of DSOs. Moreover, the TSO
is not monitoring distribution network conditions, which means that the DSO must react to
DG actions and the operation of the distribution grids is becoming more complex. In this
new context, an active distribution system management10 is proposed to ensure the better
integration of DG/RES-E in the DSO. The idea is to provide the DSO with the tools for
the maintenance of network stability by means of ICT solutions (Eurelectric, 2013a). Other
recommendations include the establishment of mechanisms to compensate the DSO for their
increasing CAPEX and OPEX due to the presence of DG by paying special attention to
their impact on losses, the implementation of local signals to promote DG contribution to
peak demand such as differentiated use-of-system (UoS) charges for DG, the promotion of
DG to provide ancillary services to help DSOs operate their networks, etc. (Fr´ıas et al.,
2009).
Our research is closely related to the above literature, and seeks to estimate the contri-
bution of the consumption profile and generation technologies to losses. In the next section
we present the Spain’s current regulatory framework of losses within the broader European
Union context. However, note that a study of the efficiency of regulator laws at the TSO
and DSO loss levels is beyond the scope of this paper because this would require a longer
period of time to achieve robust conclusions.
10The Active distribution system management is based in the interaction between planning, access and
operational timeframes. It is based in the continuous monitoring of distribution network parameters to act
over DG and consumers (Eurelectric, 2013a).
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3 Regulatory framework of losses
European Directive 1996/92/EC concerning internal electricity markets establishes the rules
for the unbundling of generation, transmission (i.e., transport on high-voltage grids) and
distribution (i.e., transport on medium/low-voltage grids to consumers) activities. Below
we discuss the main regulatory issues concerning losses in Europe and in Spain.
3.1 Regulation in Europe
In general, two complementary mechanisms are employed in determining how the costs as-
sociated with energy losses should be borne by generators and consumers in Europe. First,
zonal pricing or market splitting uses the same market-based mechanisms as those used in
the nodal price11, but rather than setting an energy price for each node, a common price is
fixed for the nodes located in a given area. This mechanism also takes into consideration
the internodal congestion between regions or even between entire countries. It is employed
in Italy, Nordel (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and MIBEL (Spain and
Portugal). Second, single energy pricing sets the same price at the nodes in a given country
or area and the effects of losses and constraints are addressed by employing other meth-
ods. For example, agents internalize losses in the prices that they bid, employing additional
mechanisms such as corrective factors in supply-side bids or in the sums of energy produced.
Constraint management mechanisms such as re-dispatch, countertrading and capacity auc-
tions address problem of congestion. This mechanism is used in many European countries
(Pe´rez-Arriaga, 2014).
Energy to cover all losses needs to be procured and, here, there are two possible courses of ac-
tion. In some European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Poland,
Sweden, Denmark and Germany, the TSOs and DSOs are responsible for the procurement
of this energy, in others, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, this energy is procured by the
suppliers, who have to inject their own energy to offset the losses associated with end-user
consumption. The two mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages, but in both in-
stances energy has to be procured using non-discriminatory, transparent and market-based
procedures (ERGEG (2008); Eurelectric (2013b)).
The components of transmission and distribution losses are not the same, which in turn
affects the regulatory mechanisms employed to improve efficiency. For instance, NTLs are
mostly, or even exclusively, present in distribution, whereas transmission losses are affected
by major external factors, including the availability of natural resources, the outcome of
generation and consumption auctions, etc. When TSOs or DSOs procure energy for losses,
there is an additional incentive if the loss rates funded by tariffs are capped, given that the
surplus represents an extra operating cost for them. An additional, complementary mecha-
nism is the establishment of rewards (or penalties) if losses are below (or above) previously
fixed reference values (ERGEG, 2008).
When a TSO has to purchase energy to cover losses, Eurelectric (2008) suggests it should
be allowed to pass through the associated costs. Similarly, Ofgem in the UK removed all
financial incentives associated with losses in transmission, arguing that it had little control
over them (Ofgem, 2015). The German and Spanish TSOs, likewise, are offered no financial
incentives in relation to losses.
11Nodal price is also referred to as the spot price or locational marginal price. The system fixes different
energy prices at each node on the basis of the effects of consumer and producer decisions on congestion,
grid constraints and losses. In the case of generation, the production of electricity at some distance from
consumption means lower nodal prices than a production closer to consumption in a city. In the case of
demand, the consumption of electricity in a generating area incurs lower nodal prices because this energy
suffers low levels of loss. Among others, this system is used in Chile, New Zealand, New England, New
Jersey and California.
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In the case of DSOs, several schemes are employed. For example, in the UK, Ofgem estab-
lishes an annual percentage of electricity losses and so operators receive a reward/penalty
linked to a set of performance indicators. Additionally, losses might be considered as oper-
ational cost reductions in investment remunerations (Ofgem, 2015). In Spain, the incentive
mechanism to reduce losses is based only on a reward (or penalty) with respect to past data.
In Germany, there are no financial incentives to minimize losses and the TSOs and DSOs
are able to recover costs when purchasing energy. However, a benchmark has been fixed to
ensure that energy is purchased efficiently. However, changes are expected in this regard in
the future (Ecofys, 2013).
3.2 Regulation in Spain
In Spain, the electricity network is divided in two sections according to voltage: a voltage
higher than or equal to 220kV12 is considered transmission and is owned and operated by
the TSO13, the Red Ele´ctrica de Espan˜a (REE). The system operator (SO) operates the
transmission network and seeks to guarantee the system’s security and continuity of supply
(REE, 2014). The rest of the network is considered as being of distribution, and is owned
and operated by several DSOs. Although in Spain there are almost 350 registered DSOs
(Ministry of Industry, 2015), five cover most of the territory (Endesa, Gas Natural Fenosa,
Iberdrola, EDP and Eon).
In the Spanish transposition of European Directive 1996/92/EC14, the distribution of elec-
tricity is defined as a regulated activity with proper levels of quality and losses. Conse-
quently, the regulatory framework in 1997 established a common DSO remuneration to be
shared between all the DSOs, without considering individual improvements in efficiency or
the geographical specifics of the area covered by each. In 2008, a reference network model
(RNM)15 was introduced to better approach the performance of the different DSO networks,
and individual loss reduction incentives were established between ±1% the remuneration of
the previous year. The cost of energy wasted was valued at the hourly market price. In the
following year16, it was increased until ±2% of the previous year’s income and zonal loss
coefficients are considered to better capture the specifics of the area covered by each DSO.
Finally, in 201317 it was modified again and the reference loss levels were fixed as values
based on the figures for several previous years. This incentive scheme is similar to the one
used in the UK, but it is capped at +1% and −2% of the allowed revenue. In Section 5, we
calculate the economic costs of losses following the same methodology.
To quantify the DSO incentive in 2011-2013 period according to the current regulatory
scheme, the annual maximum incentive reward for losses among all the DSOs stands at
about 40 Me, while the annual average cost of losses in distribution is 945 Me18. In trans-
12This is a general classification because the Spanish TSO also owns and operates an electricity grid of
less than 220kV in the Balearic and Canary Islands. However, this paper limits its study to Continental
Spain.
13Within the Third Energy Package, the Spanish TSO was organized in accordance with the Full Own-
ership Unbundling (OU) scheme. This model requires full independence of the transmission owner and
operator from any company that generates, produces or supplies electricity. The scheme is also used in other
EU countries such as the UK, Germany and Italy (European Directive 2009/72/EC).
14Law 54/1997 and Royal Decree 2819/1998.
15A reference network model (RNM) is a large-scale distribution network tool, which is able to define an
optimal distribution grid using geographical location and electrical data from the TSO, DSO and consumers.
Geographical constraints can also be considered in the simulations (Royal Decree 222/2008).
16Complementary Technical Instruction 2524/2009.
17Royal Decree 1048/2013.
18Annual income among all DSOs is about 4,000Me, so 1% represents 40 Me. The annual cost of losses
in distribution was 915 Me in 2011, 980 Me in 2012 and 940 Me in 2013.
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mission, the average annual cost of losses is 188 Me19.
In 1997, the generation sources were separately classified in two main groups: first, in-
stallations of 50 MW or less installed capacity that used RES-E, combined heat and power
plants (CHP) or waste; and, second, all other technologies: nuclear, coal, combined cycle,
etc. This facilitated the implementation of several promotion schemes for the sources in
the first group. In the period 2011-2013, RES-E plants already produced 40% of total gen-
eration. Figure (2) shows that 90% of consumption has been achieved in the distribution
networks, which implies a gap between generation and consumption. In our estimations, we
also analyse whether the impact of consumption is similar in respect of transmission and
distribution.
Figure 2: Share of total generation and consumption at TSO and DSOs in Spain (2011-2013).
DSO	losses	
TSO/DSO	
transformers	
TSO	infrastructure	
HV		
Consumers	
MV	and	LV	
Consumers	
Genera;on	
connected	to	TSO	
Genera;on	
connected	to	DSO	
c	
DSO	infrastructure	
25	%	
75	%	
10	%	
90	%	
TSO	losses	
1,4	%	
7,4	%	
Source: Own elaboration from REE (2014) and Ministry of Industry (2015).
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics and operation of each generation technology in Spain.
This is relevant because their respective impacts on losses is related to where and when they
produce. Although solar and CHP mostly generate to distribution, we expect indirect effects
on transmission losses because they might displace other sources.
In Spain, DG curtailment and feed-in management rules can only be implemented by the
SO, independently of whether they are connected to transmission or distribution20. Today,
this regulatory scenario is being questioned in order to facilitate the emergence of a more
active DSO (CNE, 2012a). Finally, Table 2 summarizes the incentives for all agents involved
in the electricity system in order to provide a better understanding of the impact of losses
on decision making.
19The annual cost of losses in transmission is 215 Me in 2011, 180 Me in 2012 and 170 Me in 2013.
20In Spain, RES-E plants are only required to have a generation control centre as an interlocutor with the
SO if they have more than 10MW of installed power.
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Table 1: Characteristics and operation of generation sources (inflows) (2011-2013).
Technol. Role in the hourly balancing of energy Network level where generates
Nt Used as a base source. Transmission
COt, CCt Used as a base source after Nuclear. Transmission
Ht
Mainly hydropower flowing.
SO can modulate its production by the
connection/disconnection of groups.
Most large flow-hydro plants inject in
transmission. The rest in distribution.
Wt
Production depends on climate. SO can
modulate its production by the
connection/disconnection of big plants.
More than 45% of energy is injected in
distribution. The rest in transmission.
SOLt
Production during sun hours. At evening
peak only thermosolar plants.
About 80% of energy is injected in
distribution. The rest in transmission.
PGt Basically used to cover high peak hours. Transmission
It Used to cover peaks periods. Transmission
CHPt Its production curve is flat over the whole day. Almost 85% is injected in distribution.
Note: Nt is nuclear, COt is coal, CCt is combined cycle, Ht is hydropower, Wt is wind, SOLt is solar,
PGt is pumping generation, It are imports and CHPt is combined heat and power.
Source: Based on CNMC (2013).
Table 2: Behaviour of agents at each stage with regard to losses in Spain (2011-2013).
Market
Agent Structure Economic loss incentives
Generator Liberalized Losses are not considered when location and daily generation bid auctions are
activity decided upon. However, both variables have an impact on TSO and DSO losses
depending on distance to loads and when produce. A common UoS charges of
0.5e/MWh are applied to generation since 2011.
Non-optimal decisions at this stage might imply greater losses and higher
costs of losses for all end-consumers.
TSO Regulated Losses are not a key performance indicator in the regulation scheme.
activity However, when investments are supposed to solve congestions problems,
losses might de indirectly affected.
DSO Regulated In contrast with the TSO, losses are a key performance indicator in the
activity regulatory scheme (incentive equal to ±1% of the year’s remuneration).
Investments, network operation and fight against consumption out of the
meter are useful instruments. It is important to highlight that decisions
taken by generators, TSO and consumers might affect their level of
losses and worsen their performance indicators.
Consumer Liberalized Consumers can choose the voltage at the meter point. The higher
activity the voltage, the less they pay to cover losses. However, this means funding
an expensive own electricity infrastructure to reduce the voltage.
Consumers are simply price takers of losses, although if a consumer decides
to consume out of the meter, these losses are socialized among the rest.
To avoid this perverse behaviour, efficient regulatory incentives and
punishments are necessary.
Source: Based on the Spanish regulatory framework.
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4 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section, we present the empirical strategy and the data used to characterise losses in
the Spanish Electricity System. In general, such losses can be defined by Eq. (3):
Lt = f(flowt) (3)
At a more disaggregated level, losses can be analysed in terms of the nature of their flow, i.e.,
as outflows and inflows, as in Eq. (4). The former, analogous to the demand-side approach,
takes into account consumption and exports, while the latter, analogous to the supply-side
approach, considers all sources of generation and imports in the electricity system. Eqs. (5)
and (6) break the outflows and inflows down into their respective components.
Lt = f(Outflowt; Inflowt) (4)
Outflowt = Ct + Et + PCt (5)
Inflowt =
∑
k
GENkt + It (6)
with: k = [N,CC,CO,H, PG, SOL,W,CHP ]
End-user consumption (domestic and industrial) is represented by Ct in Eq. (5). PCt repre-
sents the pumping consumption needed to have subsequent pumping generation (PGt). In
Eq. (6), the technologies included are as follows: N nuclear; CC combined cycle; CO coal;
H hydropower; PG pumping generation; SOL photovoltaic and thermosolar; W wind; and
CHP combined heat and power. International exchanges of energy are made between conti-
nental Spain and other countries (Andorra, France, Portugal and Morocco). Depending on
the direction of this flow, It represents the energy imports entering Spain, Et the country’s
exports. Flows through the electrical submarine interconnection from the Spanish Penin-
sula to the Balearic Islands, in operation since August 201221, are also included in It and Et.
In our regressions, we estimate separately losses in transmission (LTt) and losses in dis-
tribution (LDt), according to the network where these losses are produced
22. It should be
borne in mind that losses are inversely proportional to the voltage, and the average level of
losses in transmission (LTt) is consequently smaller than that in distribution (LDt). The
accuracy is higher in transmission because of the widespread use of continuous meters. In
distribution, small end-user consumption should be partially estimated with predetermined
and known in-advance loss profiles (ERGEG, 2008). In Spain, smart meter installation is
still not fully completed, the deadline being 201823. This affects consumers with a LV con-
nection and a contracted power rating less than (or equal to) 50 kW whose consumption
profile is currently estimated by patterns based on a representative panel of consumers24.
These LV consumers represent 40% of total demand used in the calculation of losses in
distribution (LDt) (CNE, 2012b). The difference between the final real consumption with
losses (Ct) and predicted consumption (C
p
t ) including consumers that do not have hourly
or smart meters, plus NTL, is considered Energy Close (ECt), which might be positive or
negative25 depending on its construction, as shown in Eq. (7).
ECt = (Ct − Cpt ) +NTLt (7)
21The Romulo Project comprises a High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) link of ±150kV (2x200MW)
between Sagunto (Valencia) and Calvia (Mallorca).
22The methodology used in this paper is defined in Operating procedure 5.0 for determining transmission
losses and calculation of loss coefficients per node published in BOE on 03/07/1999, Royal Decree 1048/2013
and Technical Complementary Instruction 2524/2009.
23Order IET/290/2012.
24Royal Decree 1110/2007.
25In the EC, 39% of observations are negative. However, the average value is positive: 380.88.
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Before defining the equations, we analyse which variables should be included in both the
transmission (LTt) and distribution (LDt) estimations. With respect to outflows, exports
(Et) are only used in transmission because 99.99% of the exported energy uses transmission.
Likewise, Pumping Consumption (PCt) is fully associated with transmission, and so it is
not included in distribution (LDt). Imports (It) are included in both transmission (LTt)
and distribution (LDt) because 90% of consumption is in distribution.
Losses are expected to follow a dynamic process over time. By definition, losses are pro-
portional to consumption, with the latter having an inertial component (the consumption
of one hour being highly correlated to that of the previous hour). Therefore, to capture
the dynamic process of losses properly, we include the lagged endogenous variable as an
additional explanatory variable (LTt−1 and LDt−1).
Adhering to the dual perspective of outflows and inflows (see Eqs. (5) and (6)), the anal-
ysis of the impact on losses is performed in two groups of estimations: first, the impact of
outflows (consumption) as described Eqs. (8) and (9); and, second, the impact of inflows
(generation) as described in Eqs. (10) and (11). In both cases, the equations are estimated
using the endogenous variable measured in MWh (i=M) and in e (i = C). As ECit directly
affects losses, it is measured in the same units as losses when it is included in the following
equations:
∆LiT t = β0 + β1∆L
i
T t−1 + β2∆EC
i
t + β3∆Ct + β4∆Et + β5∆PCt+
+β6PEAKt + β7DOWit + β8FESt + β9MONTHt + β10Y EARt + εt
(8)
∆LiDt = β0 + β1∆L
i
Dt−1 + β2∆EC
i
t + β3∆Ct+
+β4PEAKt + β5DOWit + β6FESt + β7MONTHt + β8Y EARt + εt
(9)
∆LiT t = β0 + β1L
i
T t−1 + β2∆EC
i
t + β3∆Nt + β4∆CCt + β5∆COt + β6∆Ht+
+β7∆PGt + β8∆SOLt + β9∆Wt + β10∆CHPt + β11∆It+
+β12DOWit + β13FESt + β14MONTHt + β15Y EARt + εt
(10)
∆LiDt = β0 + β1L
i
Dt−1 + β2∆EC
i
t + β3∆Nt + β4∆CCt + β5∆COt + β6∆Ht+
+β7∆PGt + β8∆SOLt + β9∆Wt + β10∆CHPt + β11∆It+
+β12DOWit + β13FESt + β14MONTHt + β15Y EARt + εt
(11)
As electricity demand varies during the day, a temporary variable is included in the out-
flow models (Eqs. (8) and (9)) to distinguish the highest demand hours (PEAKt=1) from
the rest. This classification is used for a share of LV consumers in Spain with two period-
meters26.
In all equations, seasonality is controlled using a set of variables: DOWt for the day of
the week27; FESt = 1 for weekday holidays and 0 otherwise; MONTHt and Y EARt cap-
ture the long-term seasonality.
26This price discrimination scheme corresponds to 2.0DHA and 2.1DHA tariffs in Spain. Consumption
during the peak period (from 12pm to 10pm) has a higher price with respect to rest of the day or off-peak
period.
27In DOWt, one value is used for everyday of the week: 0=Sunday, 1=Monday, 2=Tuesday (...) through
to 6=Saturday. We discard using a unique dummy for all working days because ECt does not follow common
patterns for all working days.
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We use an hourly dataset from 2011 to 2013. Our geographical area is continental Spain, ex-
cept for the Balearic and Canary Islands, which have been excluded because their electricity
systems could bias our results. Data used comes from REE (2014), where monthly settle-
ment reports28 are published including hourly information for all agents in the electricity
system: generators, end-consumers, TSO, DSOs, energy marketers, etc. If we compare our
research with previous studies, our approach could be considered more accurate because we
use the hourly level of losses in transmission and distribution, and the corresponding hourly
price of electricity to calculate the consequent cost. In Table 3 we present the descriptive
statistics of the variables used in the previous equations. While losses are quantified in MWh
when (i = M) and in e when (i = C), the rest of variables are all measured in MWh.
Table 3: Statistical summary of hourly variables (in e and MWh).
Variable N mean Std.Deviation min max
Losses in Transmission (LMTt) 26,304 446.25 102.14 11.81 991.20
Losses in Distribution (LMDt) 26,304 2,274.70 1,262.47 -3,395.26 7,785.20
Losses in Transmission (LCTt) 26,304 21,453.70 9,803.34 0 84,164.33
Losses in Distribution (LCDt) 26,304 108,020.3 76,090.23 -228,840.6 572,448
Energy Close (ECt) 26,304 380.88 1,268.94 -5,492.29 6,123.43
Nuclear (Nt) 26,304 6,379.79 825.78 3,291.23 7,524.35
Combined Cycle (CCt) 26,304 4,206.00 2,477.80 295.09 15,982.49
Coal (COt) 26,304 4882.38 2,252.26 -99.34 10,074.73
Hydro (Ht) 26,304 3,436.32 1,942.61 467.65 11,021.73
Pumping Generation (PGt) 26,304 257.25 351.37 -3.07 1,951.55
Solar (SOLt) 26,304 1,239.28 1,496.41 0 5,565.68
Wind (Wt) 26,304 5,497.38 3,174.46 70.40 16,671.59
Combined Head and Power (CHPt) 26,304 4,232.95 565.77 2,595.66 5,506.65
Imports (It) 26,304 648.53 536.71 0 3,089.74
Consumption (Ct) 26,304 28,184.98 5,082.955 14,095.6 42,941.02
Pumping Consumption (PCt) 26,304 578.4314 807.5924 0.751 4,092.00
Exports (Et) 26,304 1,641.47 692.91 27.26 4,172.76
Peak (PEAKt) 26,304 0.417 0.493 0 1
Source: own elaboration.
Having described the variables, we evaluate the stationarity of the time series variables
used in this paper. Firstly, we perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey
and Fuller, 1979) under the null hypothesis of a unit root and, secondly, the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests (Kwiatkowski, et al., 1992) under the null hypothesis
of stationary. For the ADF, we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for both levels and
differences. However, for the KPSS, we reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in levels but
not in differences. Both tests, therefore, confirm that our series are stationary in differences,
so we estimate the models in differences. In the next section, the results of the estimations
are presented and discussed.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of the estimations performed on the equations described
in the previous section. Losses are estimated from two perspectives: outflow (consumption
and exports) and inflow (generation and imports). Finally, an additional post-estimation
analysis is performed with the outflow results.
28In Spain, there are five monthly settlements depending on the time elapsed since the last day of the
month. The one used in this paper is C5, the most definitive report, which is published after 11 months.
In May 2011 we use the C6 settlement, which is also available. For further details see the Resolution of the
Ministry of Industry (28/07/2008) published in BOE on 31/07/2008: General procedures for SO settlements.
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test.
ADF Test ADF Test KPSS Test KPSS Test
Variable Levels Differences Levels Differences
Losses in Transmission (LMTt) -12.962
∗∗∗ -30.036∗∗∗ 17.10∗∗∗ 0.002700
Losses in Distribution (LMDt) -11.407
∗∗∗ -28.359∗∗∗ 8.74∗∗∗ 0.000197
Losses in Transmission (LCTt) -11.981
∗∗∗ -30.033∗∗∗ 20.2∗∗∗ 0.000282
Losses in Distribution (LCDt) -12.743
∗∗∗ -29.005∗∗∗ 10.80∗∗∗ 0.000160
Energy Close (ECt) -9.967∗∗∗ -30.251∗∗∗ 5.91∗∗∗ 0.000188
Nuclear (Nt) -5.107∗∗∗ -37.508∗∗∗ 79.10∗∗∗ 0.029000
Combined Cycle (CCt) -17.951∗∗∗ -25.044∗∗∗ 12.60∗∗∗ 0.000615
Coal (COt) -10.885∗∗∗ -22.995∗∗∗ 91.40∗∗∗ 0.003520
Hydro (Ht) -4.762∗∗∗ -31.778∗∗∗ 154.00∗∗∗ 0.000565
Pumping Generation (PGt) -17.868∗∗∗ -35.526∗∗∗ 5.03∗∗∗ 0.000121
Solar (SOLt) -9.225∗∗∗ -31.468∗∗∗ 6.43∗∗∗ 0.000432
Wind (Wt) -14.435∗∗∗ -26.669∗∗∗ 12.00∗∗∗ 0.004250
Combined Head and Power (CHPt) -15.887∗∗∗ -30.354∗∗∗ 40.60∗∗∗ 0.000421
Imports (It) -13.039∗∗∗ -31.873∗∗∗ 11.60∗∗∗ 0.000212
Consumption (Ct) -18.271∗∗∗ -29.836∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ 0.000439
Pumping Consumption (PCt) -13.969∗∗∗ -94.650∗∗∗ 12.50∗∗∗ 0.000240
Exports (Et) -12.627∗∗∗ -31.182∗∗∗ 31.00∗∗∗ 0.000227
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As explained, the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable as a regressor seeks to capture
the dynamic loss process. However, this might cause an endogeneity problem because the
residuals are correlated with this lagged variable. To avoid any potential bias that might
arise when using the least squares method in the presence of lagged dependent variables,
estimations are performed using maximum likelihood estimators.
Before analysing the estimations, it is important that we clarify the sign of the coefficients
associated with each outflow (or inflow). On the one hand, a positive sign associated with
the flow outcomes (MWh) in columns (1) and (2) of Tables 5 and 7 implies a higher level
of losses for an additional MWh consumed (or generated), while a negative sign implies
a lower level. Although this might seem irrational, such an outcome is technically feasible
when one flow displaces others in a real electricity system. On the other hand, a positive sign
associated with the cost outcomes (e) in columns (3) and (4) implies a higher cost of losses
caused by an additional MWh consumed (or generated). However, a negative coefficient in
this case does not necessarily mean a saving because of the presence of the hourly price: a
technology that has its main impact during periods of low demand might present positive
coefficients for flows but negative coefficients for costs. In such circumstances, we consider
absolute values for the economic cost. Finally, when both the flow and cost coefficients are
negative, this is deemed to be a cost saving.
5.1 Loss analysis from the outflow perspective
Table 5 shows the results of the loss estimations from the outflow perspective (Eqs. (8)
and (9)). In columns (1) and (2), the endogenous variables are flows measured in MWh
(i = M), while in columns (3) and (4), the endogenous variables are costs measured in e
(i = C). All the associated coefficients are significant. An interesting result is the economic
cost of the energy loss for each additional MWh consumed because it shows that the cost of
distribution losses (9.077e) is much higher than those of transmission (1.641e).
To understand better the coefficients in Table 5, we calculate the short- and long-run
marginal economic effects on losses29 in Table 6. In the short-run, the consumption marginal
effect on distribution (0.00840%) is also higher than that of transmission (0.00765%). The
29Transmission and distribution short and long-run marginal effects for each outflow are calculated as
βoi/LiT and βoi/L
i
D, and [βoi/(1 − β1)]/LiT and [βoi/(1 − β1)]/LiD, respectively. It is useful to compare
impacts on transmission and distribution for each outflow.
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Table 5: Consumption flows (outflows) impact on losses.
i = M (in MWh) i = C (in e)
∆LiT t ∆L
i
Dt ∆L
i
T t ∆L
i
Dt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LiT t−1) -0.0473
∗∗∗ 0.0772∗∗∗
(-18.11) (23.41)
∆(LiDt−1) -0.0725
∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(-59.15) (63.24)
∆Cit 0.0179
∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ 9.077∗∗∗
(124.24) (475.59) (147.70) (314.32)
∆ECit 0.0243
∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(88.50) (1356.05) (84.28) (953.92)
∆Eit 0.00443
∗∗∗ -0.760∗∗∗
(7.32) (-17.68)
∆PCit 0.0127
∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗
(19.66) (-8.50)
PEAK=1 10.67∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ 921.7∗∗∗ 2496.9∗∗∗
(26.80) (7.70) (26.66) (19.40)
Constant -4.749∗∗∗ -4.527 -368.9∗∗∗ -944.9∗∗∗
(-6.93) (-1.79) (-6.28) (-4.30)
sigma
Constant 31.92∗∗∗ 86.66∗∗∗ 2405.4∗∗∗ 8158.3∗∗∗
(669.40) (1274.97) (459.33) (692.78)
Seasonality Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Month Y Y Y Y
Fes Y Y Y Y
Dow Y Y Y Y
Observations 26303 26303 26303 26303
R2
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: LiT t and L
i
Dt are losses on transmission and distribution.
Table 6: Marginal economic effects on losses (outflows) (%).
Short-run Long-run
∆LCTt ∆L
C
Dt ∆L
C
Tt ∆L
C
Dt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Ct 0.00765 0.00840 0.00829 0.00973
∆PCt -0.00199 - -0.00216 -
∆Et -0.00354 - -0.00384 -
PEAKt 4.29602 2.31155 4.65517 2.67744
Note: LiT t and L
i
Dt are losses on transmission and distribution.
peak dummy variable captures the extra losses that occur during the peak period. In the
short-run, they represent an additional 4.30% and 2.31% of the average hourly cost of losses
in transmission and distribution, respectively. If we quantify these losses in economic terms,
their total cost is 12.48 Me/year30, equivalent to 1.10% of the total annual cost of losses.
In the long-run, the consumption marginal effects on distribution (0.00973%) and on trans-
mission (0.00829%) are slightly higher than the corresponding short-run effects. Extra losses
in the peak period correspond to an additional 4.66 and 2.68% of the average hourly cost of
30These savings are calculated from the average hourly cost of losses and their potential reduction during
the peak period of each day (10 hours): 365 · 21, 454 · 10 · (4.30%) + 365 · 108, 020 · 10 · (2.31%) = 12.48
Me/year. We have not considered the carbon emissions avoided or other externalities.
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losses in transmission and distribution, respectively. Their total cost is 14.2 Me, which repre-
sents the maximum potential economic savings from DSM policies aimed at fully smoothing
the demand profile curve.
Using the same methodology, but for the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6,
we obtain the potential savings in terms of flows of energy lost in MWh when applying the
same DSM policies. In the long-run, they represent 0.31% of the total energy lost in MWh.
These results are similar to those reported by Shaw et al. (2009). Pumping consumption is
analysed in the next section together with pumping generation.
5.2 Loss analysis from the inflow perspective
In this subsection we present the results of the estimations performed from the inflow per-
spective (Eqs. (10) and (11)). In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, the endogenous variables
are measured in MWh (i = M), while in columns (3) and (4), the endogenous variables are
costs measured in e (i = C). All associated coefficients are significant.
In Table 7, the coefficients in column (3) show the economic cost of losses in transmis-
sion for each additional MWh generated. In the case of DG sources, the economic cost
of losses in transmission for each additional MWh produced is -0.082e for solar, 1.221e
for wind and 0.858e for CHP31. These impacts are smaller than those associated with the
base sources: 1.743e for nuclear, 1.638e for combined cycle, 2.414e for coal and 2.658e for
hydro.
With respect to the impact of each additional MWh generated on distribution (see column
(4)), the impacts of both solar (4.986e) and wind (4.696e) sources are smaller than those
of the base sources: nuclear (8.946e), combined cycle (10.18e) and coal (9.678e). In the
case of hydro (8.700), the cost is higher than that of solar and wind power, but lower than
those of combined cycle and coal. In contrast, the impact of CHP (14.67e) is higher than
that of the rest of DG. The intuition for CHP is the presence of the U-shape trajectory for
losses in distribution, as proposed by Quezada et al. (2006) and Marinopoulos et al. (2011),
given that its production is not proportionally generated to the voltage of the grid in dis-
tribution32 and its hourly production profile is not well-correlated with the consumption
profile. Although solar production is also not generated proportionally to the voltage of
distribution, the U-shape trajectory for losses is not noticed because its total production is
60% smaller than that of CHP33. However, the future expansion of solar power might affect
the corresponding losses, depending on the resultant voltage of injection.
Considering both the costs of losses in transmission and distribution, an additional MWh
produced by nuclear has a total loss cost of 10.689e, compared to 4.904e in the case of
solar, 5.917e for wind and 15.528e for CHP. These results show the potential benefits for
consumer welfare of wind and solar energy generation as the total losses are smaller than
the rest of the mix. As we see in the next section, the level of CHP losses might be reduced
if its production could be lowered during periods of low demand. These results differ from
31Following the same reasoning as in the previous section, when coefficients in flows in columns (1) or (2)
have positive coefficients and coefficients in columns (3) or (4) are negative, we consider the last in absolute
values.
32For CHP, the 111,343 GWh generated in the 2011-2013 period are disproportionally generated by grid
voltage (V) at distribution: 0.46% for V<1kV; 26.52% for 1≤V<36kV; 35.38% for 36≤V<72.5kV; 20.89% for
72.5≤V<145kV and 16.75% for V>72.5kV. The 144,603 GWh generated by wind in the same period are pro-
portionate: 0.89% for V<1kV; 4.01% for 1≤V<36kV; 13.16% for 36≤V<72.5kV; 28.00% for 72.5≤V<145kV
and 53.94% for V>72.5kV (CNMC, 2013).
33For solar, the 32,597 GWh (2011-2013) are disproportionally generated as follows: 25.05% for V<1kV;
37.31% for 1≤V<36kV; 11.79% for 36≤V<72.5kV; 6.02% for 72.5≤V<145kV and 19.84% for V>72.5kV.
This technology comprises many small plants connected to the LV grid (CNMC, 2013).
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Table 7: Generation flows (inflows) impact on losses.
i = M (in MWh) i = C (in e)
∆LiT t ∆L
i
Dt ∆L
i
T t ∆L
i
Dt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(LiT t−1) -0.111
∗∗∗ 0.0285∗∗∗
(-43.53) (8.08)
∆(LiDt−1) 0.103
∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(106.05) (41.31)
∆ECit 0.00240
∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗
(9.28) (1244.99) (-34.82) (669.19)
∆N it 0.0149
∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 1.743∗∗∗ 8.946∗∗∗
(3.03) (4.88) (4.45) (4.47)
∆CCt 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗
(28.45) (97.67) (55.37) (97.22)
∆COt 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 2.414∗∗∗ 9.678∗∗∗
(27.88) (52.23) (36.61) (37.53)
∆Ht 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0974∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ 8.919∗∗∗
(75.79) (82.03) (77.02) (68.76)
∆PGt 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 3.358∗∗∗ 17.56∗∗∗
(15.81) (50.41) (43.61) (64.05)
∆SOLt -0.00124∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.082∗ 4.986∗∗∗
(-3.13) (88.89) (-2.12) (33.93)
∆Wt 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 4.696∗∗∗
(45.09) (58.04) (31.08) (31.42)
∆CHPt 0.00698∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ -0.858∗∗∗ 14.67∗∗∗
(6.92) (150.03) (-11.52) (56.50)
∆It 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0841∗∗∗ 2.985∗∗∗ 10.12∗∗∗
(46.71) (53.54) (58.46) (56.90)
Constant -0.408 -0.618 11.94 100.3
(-0.69) (-0.26) (0.21) (0.44)
sigma
Constant 30.22∗∗∗ 76.39∗∗∗ 2416.9∗∗∗ 8865.9∗∗∗
(696.97) (1478.61) (450.39) (656.48)
Seasonality Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y
Month Y Y Y Y
Fes Y Y Y Y
Dow Y Y Y Y
Observations 26303 26303 26303 26303
R2
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: LiT t and L
i
Dt are losses on transmission and distribution.
those reported by Strbac et al. (2007), who find the micro CHP is able to reduce losses by
up to 40% in rural and 33% in urban areas of the UK, because its production is highly cor-
related with the electricity profile demand. In Spain, the installed capacity of micro CHP34
is residual, which means the two results are not directly comparable.
34On September 2013, the installed capacity of CHP plants with less than or equal to 1MW of power
(also known as micro CHP) was below 200 MW, which barely amounts to 2.1% of the total CHP installed
capacity in Spain (IDAE, 2014).
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As for pumping generation technology, the prerequisite for generation is pumping consump-
tion. Consequently, we need to add 0.428e from losses in pumping consumption (Table 5)
to the 3.358e of losses in transmission and 17.56e in distribution (Table 7). Hence, for a
consumer connected to distribution, the total cost in terms of losses of consumption from
pumping generation would be 21.346e. This generation technology is almost exclusively
used during hours of maximum demand, consequently the losses are produced at the highest
hourly price, which greatly penalizes their costs in terms of the efficiency of the system.
As with the previous set of results, to understand better the coefficients in Table 7, we
calculate the short- and long-run marginal effects on losses (see Table 8). In the case of
the short-run marginal economic effects on transmission and distribution losses (columns
(1) and (2) in Table 8), pumping generation in transmission (0.01565%) and distribution
(0.01626%) has the highest effects. In transmission losses, solar has the smallest (and even
negative effect) on losses (-0.00038%), which is more than 20 times smaller than the effect
of base sources (nuclear or combined cycle). The negative sign or effect seems to indicate
that during hours of solar generation, the flows from other technologies are displaced. In
terms of distribution, wind (0.00435%) and also solar (0.00462%) present the smallest ef-
fects on losses, being almost half those of the base sources. This points to the benefits of
generating in distribution, i.e., close to points of consumption. However, CHP represents a
special case (0.01358%), with more than 85% of production being generated at distribution.
In the long-run (columns (3) and (4)), the coefficients do not vary greatly, because the lag
coefficients are quite small.
Table 8: Marginal economic effects on losses (inflows) (%).
Short-run Long-run
∆LCTt ∆L
C
Dt ∆L
C
Tt ∆L
C
Dt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Nt 0.00812 0.00828 0.00836 0.00924
∆CCt 0.00763 0.00943 0.00786 0.01051
∆COt 0.01125 0.00896 0.01158 0.00999
∆Ht 0.01239 0.00826 0.01276 0.00921
∆PGt 0.01565 0.01626 0.01611 0.01813
∆SOLt -0.00038 0.00462 -0.00039 0.00515
∆Wt 0.00569 0.00435 0.00586 0.00485
∆CHPt -0.00400 0.01358 -0.00412 0.01515
∆It 0.01391 0.00937 0.01432 0.01045
Note: LiT t and L
i
Dt are losses on transmission and distribution.
In general, from the inflow analysis, it can be seen that nuclear performs as a source base
with a small impact on losses. When technologies cover a greater share of the peak demand,
their impact on losses increases proportionally. In the case of DG, its impact on both trans-
mission and distribution is smaller than the impact of all other sources. This is not the
case for CHP in distribution where we deduce the U-shape trajectory attributable to the
disproportionate amounts of energy injected by network voltage and an incorrect correlation
between its production and the demand profile. In the extreme case, the impact of imports
and pumping generation are highest, confirming that a peaked demand profile has major
consequences for losses.
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5.3 Additional post-estimation analysis
In this section, we use the results reported above for inflows (Table 7) to calculate the hourly
price effect35. This allows us to identify the time of day when the losses in each source are
at their highest. The largest coefficients suggest that losses occur mainly during the highest
hourly price periods (or during the highest total demand periods). In contrast, the lowest
coefficients are associated with periods of low demand. The results are presented in Table
9.
Table 9: Inflow hourly price effect on LTt and LDt in e/MWh.
∆LTt ∆LDt
(1) (2)
∆Nt 116.99 94.87
∆CCt 143.68 94.28
∆COt 104.51 77.43
∆Ht 79.36 91.57
∆PGt 209.87 132.06
∆SOLt 66.26 46.60
∆Wt 59.87 52.12
∆CHPt -122.95 36.69
∆It 95.98 120.36
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Pumping generation of transmission (209.87) and distribution (132.06) obviously present
the highest values as this technology is mostly used to cover the hours of peak demand,
when prices are at their highest. The most interesting results are obtained when comparing
base sources and DG in distribution. Solar (46.60), wind (52.12) and CHP (36.69) have
much smaller effects than nuclear (94.87), combined cycle (94.28) and coal (77.43). This
might suggest that the losses produced by DG mainly occur during periods of lower demand
(when the hourly price is lowest) because energy needs to travel further in the distribution
grids until it finds a consumption point. These are the consequences of a non-dispatchable
DG connected, and potential loss reductions if DSOs would be able to manage them36 and
improve their correlation with demand. These results are in line with those reported by
Hung et al. (2013) and appear to demonstrate the potential benefits of a more dispatchable
DG source.
6 Conclusions and regulatory recommendations
In this study we have analysed the impact of each outflow (consumption) and inflow source
(generation) on electricity losses in Spain. As outlined in the introduction, such losses are
an intrinsic part of energy flows in any electricity system and they affect both the producer
and consumer surplus. Our analysis has involved a quantification of the marginal effect on
losses in MWh and e from an additional MWh consumed or produced.
35For each l source, the hourly price effect is estimated by the division of two coefficients: βlC/βlM , where
βlC is in columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, and βlM in columns (1) and (2). Consequently, the price’s hourly
effect is measured in e/MWh.
36In the case of solar power, energy is very difficult to manage. It is divided between photovoltaic cells
whose production might be managed by the use of batteries, and concentrated solar steam power stations
that use radiation to heat a fluid and generate electricity, the production of which is a little more than that
from cells (Pe´rez-Arriaga, 2014).
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In terms of outflow, we estimated the average cost of losses produced by an additional
MWh consumed in transmission (1.641e) and distribution (9.077e), when considering the
peak effect separately. In the Spanish regulatory scheme, these costs are borne by consumers
in the retail market. The highest loss cost in distribution shows that policies designed to im-
prove the system’s efficiency should be focused at the grid level, where all LV end-consumers
are connected. Thus, the use of DG to inject energy as close as possible to the point of con-
sumption seems to be an appropriate policy, since losses are directly proportional to the
distance separating generation plants from consumers.
A key finding to emerge from this study are the maximum potential economic savings in
relation to losses that can be achieved by reducing network congestion via the implementa-
tion of DSM policies, such as the use of smart meters. This allows single or flat rate tariffs
to be replaced by time-of-use tariffs and, thus, to smooth the aggregate demand profile. On
average and in the long-run, the maximum cost savings associated with this policy would
represent 1.25% of the annual cost of losses, i.e., a total of 14.2Me per year (3.6Me in trans-
mission and 10.6Me in distribution). These results are in line with other ex-ante studies
(Shaw et al. (2009) and Cronenberg et al. (2012)) and show that the incentives to reduce
losses are not great enough to encourage DSOs to finance DSM policies37. To put these
findings into the context of consumer charges, the potential 1.25% cut in losses due to less
network congestion represents an average of 0.08e per MWh consumed by LV consumers
(T<1kV) and less than 0.01e per MWh for all other consumers connected to the transmis-
sion grid. However, if a smoother demand profile could be achieved, generation plants might
operate differently to the way in which they are currently running, which would have an
additional (positive or negative) impact on losses.
In terms of inflow, we have analysed short- and long-run marginal effects on losses. The
key finding to emerge here is that the impact of each technology varies in a real electricity
system. Two circumstances account for these differences: the timing of generation (during
peak or off-peak periods) and the specific grid level (transmission or distribution). As for
the effects of DG on the distribution of losses, we find that while the marginal cost of an
additional MWh generated by solar and wind power is lower than the cost of all base sources,
the opposite is the case for CHP. We conclude that CHP generation has a U-shaped impact
on distribution losses, given that the injection of CHP production is not proportional to the
grid voltage and in periods of low demand there might be insufficient local load to absorb
its production and energy has to travel further along LV lines. Spain’s CHP installations
are composed mainly of industrial plants (with a smooth generation profile), while micro
CHP plants are largely residual due to their poor economic viability (Gonza´lez-Pino et al.,
2014) However, future technological developments and cost reductions might change this
situation, and the market might be able to exploit the potential benefits identified by Strbac
et al. (2007).
Our results suggest that an increase in solar and wind capacity would reduce energy losses;
however, at the limit, we find that this might produce a U-shaped effect (as reported above
in the case of CHP) and actually increase their respective contribution to losses. Hence,
there is a need to analyse first the changes in the demand profile due to the introduction of
smart meters. If the correlation between demand and the generation of solar power changes
in the future, the scope for the installation of increased solar capacity might also change.
The high cost of the losses associated with pumping generation plants is a direct conse-
quence of the period of time during which this technology operates. Plants are able to start
37In Spain, it is estimated that more than 27 million smart meters, together with the corresponding
infrastructure, have to be installed. However, it is very difficult to completely flatten the demand profile
given that some consumption, such as lighting, cannot be delayed to off-peak periods.
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up and shut down in a matter of minutes, which makes them ideal for coping with the
variability in RES-E production and for keeping the electricity system balanced. Pumping
consumption occurs mainly during periods of low demand when there is a surplus of gener-
ation. As a result, the average cost of losses associated with an additional MWh consumed
is small (0.428e) compared to that of the end-user consumption cost (1.641e). Pumping
generation plants operate primarily during periods of peak demand, which results in a high
average loss cost associated with the production of an additional MWh (20.98e). In the
future, the increased penetration of RES-E might increase the variability of the total gener-
ation, and in this scenario pumping is expected to gain in importance (Eurelectric, 2015).
However, the higher loss costs might counter the lower costs of solar and wind power, thus
determining the overall efficiency of the electricity system.
Our results highlight the need to improve the relationship between TSOs and DSOs in
order to consider a whole system approach with greater coordination, exchange of data and
use of flexibility (CEER, 2015). In Spain’s current regulatory framework as in other coun-
tries, DG is controlled by the SOs38 and small plants are often fully operated and controlled
by their owners. The passive role currently being adopted by DSOs will have to change
in the future. In this way, Eurelectric (2013a) proposes to become DSOs as real system
operators; a better monitoring of MV and LV distribution network parameters to act over
DG and consumers; review the grid access regimes including priority and guaranteed grid
access for renewables; enable the creation of new system services at distribution level, etc.
In the light of the inflow results, and adopting a broad system perspective, Spain’s cur-
rent regulatory scheme, in which suppliers purchase the energy required to cover losses that
are, in turn, borne by consumers, needs to be subjected to a careful analysis to determine
whether it remains valid. In the meantime, there is obvious room for improvement. Two
potential areas for action are i) the substitution of constant UoS charges in electricity pro-
duction for differentiated charges that take into consideration impact on energy losses; and
ii) the implementation of locational marginal prices in order that the costs of losses could be
shared between generators and consumers. For instance, this might involve defining different
areas in Spain in order to differentiate between low and high demand (and production) sites.
In the long-run, this could serve as an efficient signal for locating new generator plants based
on the efficiency of the whole system.
Future empirical studies of the economics of electricity losses could usefully focus on the
impact on CO2 emissions, examining those attributable to each generation technology. In
the case of outflows, the methodology proposed herein could be reapplied following the in-
troduction of smart meters in order that the impact of current DSM policies on losses might
be verified. Other potential lines of investigation include using these models to forecast the
impact of charging electric vehicles during off-peak hours, or estimating the impact of losses
on the wholesale price market (auctions) because of the greater demand for energy.
38In Spain, RES-E are monitored and controlled by a ”Control Centre of Renewable Energies” (CECRE)
operated by the TSO. Its objective is to integrate the maximum amount of generation from renewable energy
sources into the electricity system under secure conditions. However, only wind farms of over 10 MW are
connected to this control centre (REE, 2015).
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